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Abstract. Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ the-
ory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed
that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation.
We prove that the negative implications of their stationarity axiom are more far-reaching:
there is no Arrow social welfare function satisfying their stationarity axiom. We propose a
more suitable stationarity axiom, and show that an Arrow social welfare function satisfies
this modified version if and only if it is a lexicographic dictatorship where the genera-
tions are taken into consideration in chronological order. Journal of Economic Literature
Classification No.: D71.
Keywords: Multi-Profile Social Choice, Infinite-Horizon Intergenerational Choice, Lex-
icographic Dictatorships.
1 Introduction
As is well-known, the validity of Arrow’s celebrated general impossibility theorem (Arrow,
1951; 1963) hinges squarely on the finiteness of population. Fishburn (1970), Sen (1979)
and Suzumura (2000) presented their respective method of proving Arrow’s theorem and
highlighted the crucial role played by the assumption of finiteness of population. Kirman
and Sondermann (1972) and Hansson (1976) cast a new light on the structure of an Arrov-
ian social welfare function with an infinite population, revealing the structure of decisive
coalitions for an Arrow social welfare function as ultrafilters. In their analysis, however,
there was no explicit consideration of a sequential relationship among the members of an
infinite population. It was a pioneering analysis due to Ferejohn and Page (1978) that
introduced time explicitly into the analysis. Time flows only unidirectionally, and two
members t and t′ of the society, to be called generation t and generation t′, respectively,
are such that generation t′ appears in the society only after generation t appears in the
society if and only if t < t′ holds. As a result of introducing this time structure of infinite
population, Ferejohn and Page (1978) also opened a new gate towards marrying Arrovian
social choice theory and the theory of evaluating infinite intergenerational utility streams,
which was initiated by Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965). This paper is an attempt
to reexamine the Ferejohn and Page analysis of intergenerational social choice theory in
a multi-profile setting.
Starting out with Hansson’s (1976) result that any social welfare function satisfying Ar-
row’s (1951; 1963) axioms must be such that the set of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter,
we strengthen one of Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) results in an intergenerational context.
Ferejohn and Page propose a stationarity condition in an infinite-horizon multi-profile so-
cial choice model and show that if a social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s conditions
and stationarity exists, generation one must be a dictator. We prove that the implica-
tions of their stationarity condition are even more far-reaching: there exist no Arrow social
welfare functions satisfying stationarity, not even dictatorial ones. The same conclusion
holds if individual preferences are restricted to those that are history-independent. We
propose an alternative framework where the preferences of any generation are restricted
to depend on the outcome for this generation only. In that case, there do exist Arrow
social welfare functions satisfying stationarity but they are all such that generation one
has even more dictatorial power than established in the Ferejohn-Page result. Adding
Pareto indifference as a requirement leads again to an impossibility. Finally, we propose
what we suggest is a more suitable multi-profile version of stationarity and characterize
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lexicographic dictatorships where the generations are taken into consideration in chrono-
logical order. The main conclusion is that, although the infinite-population version of
Arrow’s social choice problem permits, in principle, non-dictatorial rules, these additional
possibilities all but vanish even if an alternative stationarity axiom is imposed. The re-
lationship between the Ferejohn and Page analysis and our extensions thereof, on the
one hand, and the Koopmans-Diamond analysis of the evaluation of infinite intergener-
ational utility streams and their subsequent extensions, on the other, is discussed in the
Concluding Remarks.
2 Infinite-Horizon Social Choice
Suppose there is a set of per-period alternatives X containing at least three elements, that
is, |X| ≥ 3 where |X| denotes the cardinality of X. These per-period alternatives could
be consumption bundles, for example, but we do not restrict attention to one particular
interpretation. We identify the population with a sequence of generations indexed by
the positive integers N. Let X∞ be the set of all streams of per-period alternatives x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xt, . . .) where, for each t ∈ N, xt ∈ X is the period-t alternative experienced
by generation t. We also refer to xt as the factor of x relevant for generation t.
That the set of feasible per-period alternatives is the same for all generations appears
to be a rather restrictive assumption; for example, technological progress is likely to
generate dramatically different feasible sets of consumption bundles several decades into
the future. The above more restrictive formulation is chosen because it is needed in order
to define Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) version of stationarity and their relevant results
using this property; this is the case because, to apply their axiom, some generations must
be able to assess not only their own per-period alternatives but those of other generations
as well. However, the new approach we develop in our analysis can easily accommodate
a framework where the per-period feasible sets may be period-dependent. The reason
is that our proposed model is based on axioms that do not require a generation t to be
capable of comparing per-period alternatives other than those relevant for t.
The set of all orderings on X∞ is denoted by R. A social ordering is an element R
of R. Each generation t ∈ N has an ordering Rt ∈ R. A (preference) profile is a stream
R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rt, . . .) of orderings on X∞. The set of all such profiles is denoted by
R∞. Let t ∈ N. For x ∈ X∞, we define
x≥t = (xt, xt+1, . . .) ∈ X∞
2
and, analogously, for R ∈ R∞,
R≥t = (Rt, Rt+1, . . .) ∈ R∞.
Two subsets of the unlimited domain R∞ will be of importance in this paper. We
define the forward-looking domain R∞F ⊆ R∞ by letting, for all R ∈ R∞, R ∈ R∞F if, for
each t ∈ N, there exists an ordering Qt on X∞ such that, for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ x≥tQty≥t.
Analogously, the selfish domain R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆ R∞ is obtained by letting, for all R ∈ R∞,
R ∈ R∞S if, for each t ∈ N, there exists an ordering t on X such that, for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ xt t yt.
For a relation R ∈ R, the asymmetric part P (R) of R is defined by
xP (R)y ⇔ [xRy and ¬yRx]
for all x,y ∈ X∞. The symmetric part I(R) of R is defined by
xI(R)y ⇔ [xRy and yRx]
for all x,y ∈ X∞. Furthermore, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ R, R|{x,y} is the
restriction of R to the set {x,y}.
In the infinite-horizon context studied in this paper, a social welfare function is a
mapping f :D → R, where D ⊆ R∞ with D 6= ∅ is the domain of f . The interpretation
is that, for a profile R ∈ D, f(R) is the social ranking of streams in X∞.
Arrow (1951; 1963) imposed the axioms of unlimited domain, weak Pareto and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives on a social welfare function and showed that, in the
case of a finite population, the resulting social welfare functions are dictatorial: there
exists an individual such that, whenever this individual strictly prefers one alternative
over another, this strict preference is reproduced in the social ranking, irrespective of
the preferences of other members of society. In our context, these axioms are defined as
follows.
Unlimited domain. D = R∞.
Weak Pareto. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D,
xP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ N ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
Rt|{x,y} = R
′
t|{x,y} ∀t ∈ N ⇒ f(R)|{x,y} = f(R
′)|{x,y} .
Let f :D → R be a social welfare function and let x,y ∈ X∞. A set T ⊆ N is almost
decisive for x over y for f (in short, T is adf (x,y)) if, for all R ∈ D,
xP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ T and yP (Rt)x ∀t ∈ N \ T ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
Analogously, T is decisive for x over y for f (in short, T is df(x,y)) if, for all R ∈ D,
xP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ T ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
Finally, a set T ⊆ N is decisive for f if, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D,
xP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ T ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
Clearly, N is decisive for any social welfare function f satisfying weak Pareto. If there is
a generation t ∈ N such that {t} is decisive for f , generation t is a dictator for f . Let
T (f) denote the set of all decisive sets for a social welfare function f .
Hansson (1976) has shown that if a social welfare function f satisfies unlimited domain,
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then T (f) must be an ultrafilter.
An ultrafilter on N is a collection U of subsets of N such that
1. ∅ 6∈ U ;
2. ∀T, T ′ ⊆ N, [[T ∈ U and T ⊆ T ′] ⇒ T ′ ∈ U ];
3. ∀T, T ′ ∈ U , T ∩ T ′ ∈ U ;
4. ∀T ⊆ N, [T ∈ U or N \ T ∈ U ].
The conjunction of properties 1 and 4 implies that N ∈ U and, furthermore, the conjunc-
tion of properties 1 and 3 implies that the disjunction in property 4 is exclusive—that is,
T and N \ T cannot both be in U .
We conclude this section with a statement and discussion of Hansson’s (1976) obser-
vation regarding decisive sets in our framework. We do not provide a proof at this point
because it is analogous to our proof of a new variant of the theorem that applies to a
different domain; see Section 4.
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Theorem 1 (Hansson, 1976) If a social welfare function f satisfies unlimited domain,
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then T (f) is an ultrafilter.
An ultrafilter U is principal if there exists a t ∈ N such that, for all T ⊆ N, T ∈ U if
and only if t ∈ T . Otherwise, U is a free ultrafilter. It can be verified easily that if N is
replaced with a finite set, then the only ultrafilters are principal and, therefore, Hansson’s
theorem reformulated for finite populations reduces to Arrow’s (1951; 1963) theorem—
that is, there exists an individual (or a generation) t which is a dictator. In the infinite-
population case, a set of decisive coalitions that is a principal ultrafilter corresponds to
a dictatorship just as in the finite case. Unlike in the finite case, however, there also
exist free ultrafilters but they cannot be defined explicitly; the proof of their existence
relies on non-constructive methods such as the axiom of choice. These free ultrafilters are
non-dictatorial.
3 Stationarity and the Forward-Looking Domain
None of the above-defined axioms invoke the intertemporal structure imposed by our
intergenerational interpretation. In contrast, the following stationarity property proposed
by Ferejohn and Page (1978) is based on the unidirectional nature of time. The intuition
underlying stationarity is that if two streams of per-period alternatives agree in the first
period, their relative social ranking is unchanged if this common first-period alternative
is eliminated. To formulate a property of this nature in a multi-profile setting, the profile
under consideration for each of the two comparisons must be specified. In Ferejohn and
Page’s (1978) contribution, the same profile is employed before and after the first-period
alternative is eliminated. It seems to us that this leads to a rather demanding requirement
because the preferences of the first generation continue to be present even though the
alternative relevant for this generation has been eliminated. We will show that, as a
consequence, an impossibility result is obtained, thus strengthening Ferejohn and Page’s
(1978) theorem establishing that generation one is a dictator. Ferejohn and Page’s (1978)
stationarity axiom, which is due originally to Koopmans (1960) in a related but distinct
context, is defined as follows.
Stationarity. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D, if x1 = y1, then
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥2f(R)y≥2.
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Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) result is the following. We prove a variant of the theorem
on a different domain in Section 4 of this paper. As is the case for Hansson’s (1976)
theorem, it will be obvious how the proof can be modified so as to accommodate the
unlimited-domain assumption.
Theorem 2 (Ferejohn and Page, 1978) If a social welfare function f satisfies unlim-
ited domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and stationarity, then
generation one is a dictator for f .
Our first new result strengthens Theorem 2. In particular, the following theorem
shows that not even the generation-one dictatorships identified in the previous result
satisfy stationarity in addition to Arrow’s axioms. We obtain the following theorem,
which settles an open question posed by Ferejohn and Page (1978, p.273) in the negative.
Theorem 3 There exists no social welfare function that satisfies unlimited domain, weak
Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and stationarity.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f is a social welfare function that satisfies
the axioms of the theorem statement. Let x, y ∈ X and define the streams
x = (x, x, x, . . .) = (x,x),
y = (y, y, y, . . .) = (y,y),
z = (y, x, x, . . .) = (y,x).
Let R ∈ R∞F ⊆ R∞ be a profile such that
zP (R1)y
and
y = y≥tP (Rt)x≥t = x
for all t ∈ N. By Theorem 2, generation one is a dictator and, thus,
zP (f(R))y. (1)
By stationarity,
xf(R)y ⇔ z≥2f(R)y≥2 ⇔ zf(R)y
and, thus, xP (f(R))y by (1). But yP (f(R))x by weak Pareto, a contradiction.
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Theorem 3 shows that Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) stationarity axiom is too strong in
the presence of the Arrow axioms—not even dictatorial rules survive if this property is
added. A possible way of weakening Arrow’s axioms is to dispense with the unlimited-
domain assumption. This seems to be a natural way to proceed because it is not clear why
generation t’s preferences should depend on the situation of their distant ancestors. Thus,
a plausible domain restriction is obtained if the preferences of generation t are restricted
to depend on the per-period alternatives involving {t, t+ 1, . . .} only.
Forward-looking domain. D = R∞F .
Replacing unlimited domain with forward-looking domain, however, does not resolve the
impossibility result of Theorem 3. This is the case because Hansson’s (1976) theorem and
Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) dictatorship result remain true if unlimited domain is replaced
with forward-looking domain (see Section 4 for details) and the profiles used in the proof
of Theorem 3 are all forward-looking profiles. Thus, the conclusions of Theorems 1, 2
and 3 remain true if the unlimited-domain assumption is replaced with forward-looking
domain.
Theorem 4 If a social welfare function f satisfies forward-looking domain, weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then T (f) is an ultrafilter.
Theorem 5 If a social welfare function f satisfies forward-looking domain, weak Pareto,
independence of irrelevant alternatives and stationarity, then generation one is a dictator
for f .
Theorem 6 There exists no social welfare function that satisfies forward-looking domain,
weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and stationarity.
In view of Theorem 6, we require more stringent domain restrictions than that implied
by the forward-looking domain assumption in order to accommodate properties such as
stationarity in an intergenerational infinite-horizon setting. Alternatively, we may con-
sider modifying the stationarity axiom. Both of these routes are explored in the following
section.
4 The Selfish Domain and Multi-Profile Stationarity
The selfish-domain assumption requires preference profiles to be members of R∞S , that is,
each generation t cares exclusively about the factor xt of an alternative x that is relevant
for this generation.
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Selfish domain. D = R∞S .
Recall that, for any profile R ∈ R∞S and for any t ∈ N, there exists an ordering t on X
such that xRty if and only if xt t yt.
This domain restriction allows us to resolve the impossibility results of Theorems 3
and 6. However, the resulting social welfare functions are dictatorial in a strong sense. We
show that even with a selfish domain, Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) version of stationarity
requires that generation one determines the social ranking of two alternatives x and y if
it has a strict preference between x1 and y1. If x1 = y1, the preferences of generation one
are consulted regarding period-two outcomes, and so on. In the context of social welfare
functions satisfying selfish domain, we say that generation one is a strong dictator for f
if, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ R∞S ,
[∃t ∈ N such that [xτ = yτ ∀τ < t and xtP (1)yt]] ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
We begin by proving a version of Hansson’s (1976) theorem that applies to the selfish
domain. It is straightforward to see that the proof can be adapted easily to apply to the
unlimited domain and the forward-looking domain as well; replacing all occurrences of
R∞S with R∞ or with R∞F leaves all arguments intact.
The two following preliminary results will be of convenience in establishing Hansson’s
theorem on our modified domain. Again, it is straightforward to see that the proofs
go through without difficulties under either of the two alternative domain assumptions
considered in this paper.
Lemma 1 Let f be a social welfare function that satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let x,y ∈ X∞ and let T ⊆ N. If T is
adf(x,y), then T is df(x,y).
Proof. Let f be a social welfare function that satisfies the three requisite axioms, let
x,y, z ∈ X∞ be pairwise distinct and let T ⊆ N be adf (x,y). Consider a profile R ∈
R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆ R∞ such that
zP (Rt)xP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ T,
yP (Rt)zP (Rt)x ∀t ∈ N \ T.
By weak Pareto, zP (f(R))x. Because T is adf (x,y), we have xP (f(R))y. By transitivity,
zP (f(R))y. This implies that T is adf(z,y) by independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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Now consider a profile R′ ∈ R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆ R∞ such that
xP (R′t)zP (R′t)y ∀t ∈ T,
xP (R′t)z and yP (R′t)z ∀t ∈ N \ T.
By weak Pareto, xP (f(R′))z. Because T is adf(z,y) as just established, it follows that
zP (f(R′))y. By transitivity, xP (f(R′))y. Because the relative ranking of x and y is
not specified in the preferences of the individuals in N \ T , independence of irrelevant
alternatives implies that T is df(x,y).
Lemma 2 Let f be a social welfare function that satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Let x,y ∈ X∞ and let T ⊆ N. If T is
df(x,y), then T ∈ T (f).
Proof. The proof proceeds as the proof of Lemma 1 by establishing that df(x,y) implies
df(z,w) for all constellations of z and w.
Our version of Hansson’s (1976) theorem is formulated for the selfish domain but it is
easy to see that every occurrence of R∞S can be replaced with R∞ or with R∞F without
affecting the validity of the arguments employed.
Theorem 7 If a social welfare function f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto and in-
dependence of irrelevant alternatives, then T (f) is an ultrafilter.
Proof. Suppose f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. We need to show that T (f) has the four properties of an ultrafilter.
1. If ∅ ∈ T (f), we obtain xP (f(R))y and yP (f(R))x for any two alternatives x,y ∈ X∞
and for any profile R ∈ R∞S , which is impossible. Thus, ∅ 6∈ T (f).
2. This property follows immediately from the definition of decisiveness.
3. Suppose T, T ′ ∈ T (f). Let x,y, z ∈ X∞ be pairwise distinct and let R ∈ R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆
R∞ be such that
xP (Rt)yP (Rt)z ∀t ∈ T \ T ′,
zP (Rt)xP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ T ∩ T ′,
yP (Rt)zP (Rt)x ∀t ∈ T ′ \ T.
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Because T is decisive, we have xP (f(R))y. Because T ′ is decisive, we have zP (f(R))x. By
transitivity, zP (f(R))y. This implies that T∩T ′ is adf(z,y) by independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Lemma 1 implies that T ∩ T ′ is df(z,y) and, by Lemma 2, T ∩ T ′ ∈ T (f).
4. Let T ⊆ N. Let x,y, z ∈ X∞ and R ∈ R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆ R∞ be such that
xP (Rt)zP (Rt)y ∀t ∈ T,
yP (Rt)xP (Rt)z ∀t ∈ N \ T.
If xP (f(R))y, T is adf(x,y) by independence of irrelevant alternatives and, by Lemma
1, T is df(x,y). Now Lemma 2 implies that T ∈ T (f).
If ¬ (xP (f(R))y), we have yf(R)x by completeness. Furthermore, xP (f(R))z by
weak Pareto. Transitivity implies yP (f(R))z and, by independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, N \ T is adf(y, z). Lemma 1 implies that N \ T is df(y, z) and Lemma 2 yields
N \ T ∈ T (f).
Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) conclusion regarding the dictatorial role played by gener-
ation one also remains valid on the selfish domain. Thus, we obtain
Theorem 8 If a social welfare function f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives and stationarity, then generation one is a dictator for f .
Proof. Suppose f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives and stationarity. By Theorem 7, T (f) is an ultrafilter. Let x and y be two
distinct elements of X and let  be an ordering on X such that xP ()y. Define a profile
R ∈ R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆ R∞ by letting, for all t ∈ N and for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ xt  yt.
Now consider the streams
x = (x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = (x,y),
y = (y, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = (y,x),
z = (x, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = (x,x),
w = (y, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = (y,y).
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We have xP (Rt)y for all odd t and yP (Rt)x for all even t. Because of property 4 of an
ultrafilter, one of the two sets {2, 4, 6, . . .} and {1, 3, 5, . . .}must be decisive. If {2, 4, 6, . . .}
is decisive, we have
yP (f(R))x. (2)
By stationarity,
xf(R)z ⇔ x≥2f(R)z≥2 ⇔ yf(R)x
and, thus, xP (f(R))z by (2). Analogously, stationarity implies
wf(R)y ⇔ w≥2f(R)y≥2 ⇔ yf(R)x
and (2) implies wP (f(R))y. By transitivity, wP (f(R))z. We have zP (Rt)w for all
t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} and, because {2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive and {2, 4, 6, . . .} ⊆ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .},
property 2 of an ultrafilter implies that {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive. Thus, zP (f(R))w, a
contradiction. Therefore, {1, 3, 5, . . .} must be decisive and, thus,
xP (f(R))y. (3)
By stationarity,
zf(R)x ⇔ z≥2f(R)x≥2 ⇔ xf(R)y
and, thus, zP (f(R))x by (3). Analogously, stationarity implies
yf(R)w ⇔ y≥2f(R)w≥2 ⇔ xf(R)y
and (3) implies yP (f(R))w. By transitivity, zP (f(R))w. Because zP (Rt)w for all
t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} and wP (Rt)z for all t ∈ {3, 5, 7, . . .}, {3, 5, 7, . . .} cannot be decisive.
By property 4 of an ultrafilter, it follows that {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive.
We have thus established that {1, 3, 5, . . .} and {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} are decisive and, by
property 3 of an ultrafilter, {1} = {1, 3, 5, . . .} ∩ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive, which means
generation one is a dictator.
With selfish domain, we do not obtain an impossibility but all that is left as a possi-
bility if stationarity is added to the list of axioms is a strong dictatorship of generation
one.
Theorem 9 If a social welfare function f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives and stationarity, then generation one is a strong dictator
for f .
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Proof. Suppose f satisfies the axioms of the theorem statement. Let t ∈ N and suppose
x,y ∈ X∞ and R ∈ R∞S are such that
xτ = yτ ∀τ < t and xtP (1)yt.
Apply stationarity t− 1 times to obtain
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥tf(R)y≥t. (4)
By Theorem 8, generation one is a dictator so that xtP (1)yt implies x≥tP (f(R))y≥t
and, thus, xP (f(R))y by (4).
The set of social welfare functions satisfying the axioms of Theorem 9 is not empty.
For example, the social welfare function f defined by letting, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for
all R ∈ R∞S , xf(R)y if and only if
[xτI(1)yτ ∀ τ ∈ N] or [∃t ∈ N such that [xτ I(1)yτ ∀τ < t and xtP (1)yt]]
satisfies the required axioms. However, it does not satisfy Pareto indifference, another
Pareto condition that requires unanimous indifference to be respected by a social aggre-
gation procedure.
Pareto indifference. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D,
xI(Rt)y ∀t ∈ N ⇒ xI(f(R))y.
More generally, adding Pareto indifference to the axioms of Theorem 9 produces an im-
possibility.
Theorem 10 There exists no social welfare function that satisfies selfish domain, weak
Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, stationarity and Pareto indifference.
Proof. Suppose f satisfies the axioms of the theorem statement. By Theorem 9, gener-
ation one is a strong dictator for f . Let x, y ∈ X and consider the two streams
x = (x, x, x, x, . . .) = (x, x,x),
y = (x, y, x, x, . . .) = (x, y,x).
Let R ∈ R∞S be a profile such that xP (1)y and xI(2)y. By Pareto indifference and
reflexivity, xI(f(R))y. Because generation one is a strong dictator, xP (f(R))y and we
have a contradiction.
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In Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) stationarity axiom, the same profileR is applied in both
comparisons even though the period-one alternative is no longer present. This seems to
us to be rather counter-intuitive and, consequently, we propose the following version that
takes this point into consideration by eliminating the first-period factor not only from the
alternatives but also from the profile.
Multi-profile stationarity. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D, if x1 = y1, then
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥2f(R≥2)y≥2.
Unlike stationarity, multi-profile stationarity does not require generation t to be able to
compare per-period alternatives other than those relevant for period t itself. Because this
is the case for all other axioms as well, our two final results remain true if the per-period
sets of alternatives are period-dependent, thus providing a more realistic framework. For
simplicity of presentation, we do not state these alternative versions explicitly and leave
it to the reader to verify that if X is replaced with Xt for each t ∈ N, all arguments
continue to go through, provided that each Xt contains at least three elements.
We now examine the implications of our multi-profile stationarity axiom. If it is used
to replace stationarity in the statement of Theorem 10, a chronological dictatorship is
characterized. In contrast to the strongly dictatorial rules of Theorem 9, a chronological
dictatorship consults generation one first but, in the case of indifference, then moves on
to consult generation two regarding the ranking of two streams, and so on. Thus, there
still is a very strong dictatorship component but it is not as extreme as that generated
by stationarity—and it is compatible with Pareto indifference.
The chronological dictatorship fCD is defined as follows. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for
all R ∈ R∞S , xfCD(R)y if and only if
[xτ I(τ )yτ ∀ τ ∈ N] or [∃t ∈ N such that [xτI(τ )yτ ∀τ < t and xtP (t)yt]].
In a first step towards our characterization result, we show that Ferejohn and Page’s
(1978) dictatorship result is true even on a selfish domain and with multi-profile station-
arity instead of stationarity. Some steps in the proof of Theorem 8 have to be amended
in order to establish this new version of the result.
Theorem 11 If a social welfare function f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and multi-profile stationarity, then generation one is
a dictator for f .
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Proof. Suppose f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alter-
natives and multi-profile stationarity. By Theorem 7, T (f) is an ultrafilter. Let x and y
be two distinct elements of X and let  be an ordering on X such that xP ()y. Define
a profile R ∈ R∞S ⊆ R∞F ⊆ R∞ by letting, for all t ∈ N and for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ xt  yt.
Now consider the streams
x = (x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = (x,y),
y = (y, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = (y,x),
z = (x, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = (x,x),
w = (y, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = (y,y).
We have xP (Rt)y for all odd t and yP (Rt)x for all even t. Because of property 4 of an
ultrafilter, one of the two sets {2, 4, 6, . . .} and {1, 3, 5, . . .}must be decisive. If {2, 4, 6, . . .}
is decisive, we have
yP (f(R))x and yP (f(R≥2))x. (5)
By multi-profile stationarity,
xf(R)z ⇔ x≥2f(R≥2)z≥2 ⇔ yf(R≥2)x
and, thus, xP (f(R))z by (5). Analogously, multi-profile stationarity implies
wf(R)y ⇔ w≥2f(R≥2)y≥2 ⇔ yf(R≥2)x
and (5) implies wP (f(R))y. By transitivity, wP (f(R))z. We have zP (Rt)w for all
t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} and, because {2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive and {2, 4, 6, . . .} ⊆ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .},
property 2 of an ultrafilter implies that {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive. Thus, zP (f(R))w, a
contradiction. Therefore, {1, 3, 5, . . .} must be decisive and, thus,
xP (f(R))y and xP (f(R≥2))y. (6)
By multi-profile stationarity,
zf(R)x ⇔ z≥2f(R≥2)x≥2 ⇔ xf(R≥2)y
and, thus, zP (f(R))x by (6). Analogously, multi-profile stationarity implies
yf(R)w ⇔ y≥2f(R≥2)w≥2 ⇔ xf(R≥2)y
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and (6) implies yP (f(R))w. By transitivity, zP (f(R))w. Because zP (Rt)w for all
t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} and wP (Rt)z for all t ∈ {3, 5, 7, . . .}, {3, 5, 7, . . .} cannot be decisive.
By property 4 of an ultrafilter, it follows that {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive.
We have thus established that {1, 3, 5, . . .} and {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} are decisive and, by
property 3 of an ultrafilter, {1} = {1, 3, 5, . . .} ∩ {1, 2, 4, 6, . . .} is decisive, which means
generation one is a dictator.
The final result of this paper characterizes fCD.
Theorem 12 A social welfare function f satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto indifference and multi-profile stationarity if and
only if f = fCD.
Proof. That fCD satisfies the required axioms can be verified by the reader. To prove
the converse implication, suppose f satisfies the required axioms. It is sufficient to show
that, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ R∞S ,
xI(fCD(R))y ⇒ xI(f(R))y (7)
and
xP (fCD(R))y ⇒ xP (f(R))y. (8)
(7) follows immediately from Pareto indifference. To prove (8), suppose t ∈ N, x,y ∈ X∞
and R ∈ R∞S are such that
xτ I(τ )yτ ∀τ < t and xtP (t)yt.
Apply multi-profile stationarity t − 1 times (and Pareto indifference where required) to
obtain
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥tf(R≥t)y≥t. (9)
Applying the result of Theorem 11, the relative ranking of x≥t and y≥t according to
R≥t is determined by the strict preference for x over y according to the first generation
in the profile R≥t (which is generation t in R), so that x≥tP (f(R≥t))y≥t and, by (9),
xP (f(R))y.
5 Concluding Remarks
In concluding this paper, it may be worthwhile to clarify the relationship between the
multi-profile intergenerational social choice theory developed in this paper, on the one
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hand, and the theory of evaluating infinite intergenerational utility streams, which capital-
izes on the Koopmans (1960) analysis of impatience and the Diamond (1965) impossibility
theorem on the existence of continuous evaluation orderings over the set of infinite util-
ity streams satisfying the Sidgwick (1907) anonymity principle and the Pareto efficiency
principle, on the other. Among many contributions that appeared after Diamond (1965),
those which are most relevant in the present context include Asheim, Mitra and Tungod-
den (2007), Basu and Mitra (2003; 2007), Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007), Hara,
Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2007) and Svensson (1980). Although these two lines of
inquiry are related in the sense that both are concerned with aggregating generational
evaluations of their well-beings into the overall social evaluation, they contrast sharply in
at least two respects. In the first place, the latter investigation is welfaristic in the sense
of basing the overall social evaluation on the infinite-generational utility streams, whereas
the former exercise is free from such an early commitment to this informational basis. In
the second place, while the latter approach hinges squarely on the continuity assumption
even in a vestigial form, the former has nothing to do with any continuity assumption
on social welfare orderings. More substantially, the Sidgwick anonymity principle, which
plays a crucial role in establishing the Diamond impossibility theorem and related work,
has nothing to do with our impossibility theorems. The same observation also applies
to the Hammond (1976) equity axiom, which plays an important role in some recent
developments in the theory of evaluating infinite-generational utility streams. Since con-
tinuity is a requirement which is rather technical in nature, to get rid of the dependence
on this assumption may be counted as a virtue rather than a vice. Although the Sidg-
wick anonymity principle and the Hammond equity principle have an obvious intuitive
appeal, it is fortunate that we need not go against these appealing axioms in defending
our approach. It can surely be added to the list of axioms but all that is thereby ob-
tained is another set of Arrow-type impossibility results, some of which will even contain
redundancies.
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